Macroeconomic Impact of Bank Regulation and Supervision: A cross-country investigation by Dincer, N. Nergiz & Neyapti, B.
This article was downloaded by: [Bilkent University]
On: 03 July 2015, At: 07:05
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered
office: 5 Howick Place, London, SW1P 1WG
Click for updates
Emerging Markets Finance and Trade
Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/mree20
Macroeconomic Impact of Bank
Regulation and Supervision: A Cross-
Country Investigation
Bilin Neyapti a & N. Nergiz Dincer b
a Department of Economics, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey
b Department of Economics, TED University, Ankara, Turkey
Published online: 05 Dec 2014.
To cite this article: Bilin Neyapti & N. Nergiz Dincer (2014) Macroeconomic Impact of Bank Regulation
and Supervision: A Cross-Country Investigation, Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 50:1, 52-70
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/REE1540-496X500103
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the
“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,
our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to
the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions
and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,
and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content
should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources
of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,
proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or
howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising
out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any
substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,
systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &
Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-
and-conditions
52 Emerging Markets Finance & Trade
Emerging Markets Finance & Trade / January–February 2014, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 52–70.
© 2014 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved. Permissions: www.copyright.com 
ISSN 1540–496X (print) /ISSN 1558–0938 (online)
DOI: 10.2753/REE1540-496X500103
Macroeconomic Impact of Bank Regulation and 
Supervision: A Cross-Country Investigation
Bilin Neyapti and N. Nergiz Dincer
ABSTRACT: Bank regulation and supervision (RS) is a formal institutional mechanism that 
aims to reduce the adverse selection and moral hazard risks in the banking sector. This paper 
offers an empirical exploration of the relationship between banking-sector performance and 
RS using data on the legal quality of bank regulation and supervision. The main channels 
via which RS affects bank performance are considered to be depositor trust, investment 
mobilization, and borrower discipline. An event study of up to fifty-three countries provides 
robust evidence that RS has significant positive effects on bank deposits and investment 
rate and significant negative effects on nonperforming loans.
KEY WORDS: bank performance, bank regulation and supervision.
Legislation on bank regulation and supervision (RS) constitutes a key formal institution 
that serves to improve banking-sector performance by reducing the adverse selection 
and moral hazard risks that the sector faces. The positive interrelationships between 
economic growth and the legal framework of the banking sector, specifically regarding 
creditor rights and contract enforcement, have been widely discussed and documented 
(for a survey and evidence, see, e.g., Levine 1998).
In a theoretical model, Kilinc and Neyapti (2012) use a dynamic general equilibrium 
framework to show that RS leads to welfare gains. The authors argue that while the mar-
ginal effect of RS on welfare decreases with the level of development, increasing RS up 
to a threshold level is associated with a positive relationship between bank monitoring 
and the real-sector quality. This paper provides an empirical investigation of Kilinc and 
Neyapti, who hypothesize that RS affects banking-sector performance through mainly 
three channels. First, by promoting depositors’ trust in the banking sector, RS increases 
the ratio of deposits to GDP (gross domestic product). Second, by promoting effective 
balance sheet management, background checks, and monitoring, RS facilitates banks’ 
ability to channel funds into efficient investment projects. Third, through effective 
supervision, RS increases the ratio of loans returned to banks or reduces the ratio of 
nonperforming loans.
We argue that RS contributes to financial market development by reducing the 
transaction costs and hence enhancing trust in the banking sector. The positive relation-
ship between trust and financial market development has been evidenced in the works 
of Calderon et al. (2001) and Guiso et al. (2004).1 Several other studies have recently 
provided empirical investigations of the effects of bank regulation (specifically capital 
requirement) on bank deposits and loans (for advanced countries, see, e.g., Cosimano 
and Hakura 2011; and for Europe, see Schmitz 2005); the findings generally demonstrate 
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that higher bank capital is associated positively with deposits and negatively with bank 
lending or riskiness of bank portfolios. Ag¬ca and Celasun (2012) show that the impact of 
credit market reforms on bank performance improves with institutional quality.
Using survey-based measures of bank regulation and supervision, Barth et al. (2005) 
conduct an extensive study wherein they argue that regulatory and supervisory intensity 
reduces banking efficiency except in countries with developed political institutions; they 
do not find a significant relationship between capital regulations and bank performance. 
Also using survey-based indicators, both Allen and Gale (2007) and de Haan and Shehzad 
(2009) argue, however, that regulatory intensity reduces banking crises. The negative 
correlation between RS and the magnitude of output losses from crises lends support to 
the latter view (see Appendix Figure A1).2
Several studies have also pointed to the significant role of macroeconomic stability in 
affecting the level of nonperforming loans (for country-level studies, see, e.g., Louzis et al. 
2012 and Vogiazas and Nikolaidou 2011; for advanced economies, Nkusu 2011; and for 
the case of Europe, Rinaldi and Sanchis-Arellano 2006). In addition, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga (1999) demonstrate that bank profitability is associated closely with a variety of 
structural and institutional elements besides macroeconomic indicators. Using a sample of 
emerging economies, Kutan et al. (2012) also show that not only macroeconomic factors 
but also institutions have a significant effect on bank profitability.
In view of the foregoing, it is possible to say that the evidence on the role of bank 
regulation and supervision on banking-sector performance has not been decisive. This 
is partly because, until recently, an objective and broad-based, or a holistic, measure of 
the legal quality of the bank regulatory and supervisory frameworks has not been avail-
able on a comparative basis and partly because the existing studies have focused either 
on macroeconomic factors only or on macroeconomic factors in addition to a specific 
aspect of regulation, such as capital requirements.
Using an extensive set of criteria, Neyapti and Dincer (2005) provide an index of 
bank regulation and supervision called RS that measures the extent of transparency, 
restrictiveness, and coverage of banking laws. The authors argue that, if bank laws 
have been tailored to eliminate the transaction costs prevailing in a given economic and 
structural environment, legal-based measures can be regarded superior to survey-based 
measures as the former overcomes the various sources of subjectivity. Notwithstanding 
the different extent of adherence to law across countries, we use the legal indexes of RS 
to investigate the effects of RS on banking sector performance by testing the above-stated 
hypotheses empirically. In doing this, the foregoing literature sheds light on the selection 
of control variables. 
Data and Methodology
Levine (1998) reports that banking-sector development (measured by the ratio of private 
credit to GDP) is positively related to legal creditor rights and contract enforcement. 
We take the inquiry into the relationship between legal frameworks and the banking 
sector performance further and explore the channels via which banking laws affect the 
various indicators of banking sector efficiency or effectiveness. To do this, we employ 
the Neyapti and Dincer (2005) index of the legal quality of bank regulation and super-
vision: RS. RS is based on a list of ninety-nine criteria that cover legal provisions read 
from the banking laws. These measurement criteria can be summarized in eight main 
categories: (1) capital requirements, (2) lending, (3) ownership structure, (4) directors 
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54 Emerging Markets Finance & Trade
and managers, (5) reporting/recording requirements, (6) corrective action, (7) supervi-
sion, and (8) deposit insurance.3 The RS index is available for fifty-three (twenty-four 
transitional, eleven developed, and eighteen developing) countries and is the only legal 
measure of RS available to date. Appendix B reports the list of the countries and the years 
of the RS indexes used in the current analysis.
Our empirical analysis of the relationship between RS index and banking-sector per-
formance focuses on three essential aspects of bank performance: deposits, investments, 
and nonperforming loans. To test the relationship between RS and depositor trust, we use 
the ratio of deposits to GDP, denoted by DEPgdp. The dependent variables chosen to test 
the effects of RS on investment and borrower behavior are the ratios of investment to GDP 
(INVgdp) and of nonperforming loans (NPL) to total credits (NPLcr), respectively.4
All the banking performance indicators are organized in five-year averages following 
the enactment years of banking laws. The enactment year of the banking laws, based 
on which RS has been coded, identify the events in our empirical analysis. Due to data 
limitations, however, the estimation of NPLcr is performed with the start date of 2000. 
Employing all the other explanatory variables in five-year lagged averages with respect 
to the event date (the start of RS) eliminates potential simultaneity problems. For twelve 
countries in the sample, the time dimension of data is two due to reenactment of banking 
laws. Hence, the resulting data set is in a panel format where, depending on the model 
estimated, the number of observations is between thirty-four and sixty-one.5 To control 
for possible cross-sectional heterogeneity, the White heteroskedasticity correction is 
applied to the error terms.
Table 1 reports the cross-sectional correlations between the eight main components of 
the RS index and the banking performance indicators (in averages over the following five 
years, where available). As expected, deposit insurance attracts deposits, as reflected in the 
positive correlation of 0.35 for DEPgdp. DEPgdp is positively correlated also with capital 
requirements (0.41), indicating that regulation improves depositor confidence in banks. 
Also as expected, regulations regarding reporting-recording requirements, supervision, 
and ownership are all highly negatively correlated with NPLcr (–0.50, –0.51, and –0.38, 
respectively). While regulatory provisions on bank lending are positively associated with 
investment (0.27), it is interesting that legal provisions on both capital requirements and 
director-manager qualifications are negatively associated with investment (–0.37 and 
–0.38, respectively). The negative relation is even more prevalent concerning deposit 
insurance (–0.62). The empirical investigation below indicates, however, that this obser-
vation may pertain to specific structural circumstances.
Appendix Figures A2–A4 in show the scatter plots of RS against the variables dis-
cussed above, depicting associations in the expected directions. The following section 
presents a formal investigation of the significance of these observations via regression 
analyses.
Empirical Analysis
The benchmark regression models to investigate the relationships of deposits, invest-
ments, and nonperforming loans with RS are given in Equations (1) to (3). Under each 
equation, the expected signs of coefficients are reported. Given that the event-study nature 
of the data implies a cross-sectional study as explained above, the regression models are 
constrained by the degrees of freedom problem; we therefore choose to report only the 
parsimonious models below.
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Bank deposits are modeled to test the hypothesis that bank regulation increases bank 
deposits by improving depositors’ trust in the banking sector. While deposit insurance, a 
part of the RS index, may not itself be well designed to achieve depositors-induced market 
discipline, other features of the banking law may compensate for it, which is why we use 
a summary index RS. In testing this relationship, the usual control variables are chosen 
to be the return on deposits, savings, and the level of financial development.
 DEPgdp = f (RS, rDep, Sgdp, CRgdp).  (1)
In Equation (1), DEPgdp stands for the GDP ratio of demand deposits in the banking 
sector. rDep is the real rate of interest on deposits; Sgdp and CRgdp stand for the ratios 
of savings and total bank credits to GDP (as a measure of financial market development), 
respectively.
Equation (2) presents an investment model as a function of real growth rate (GDPgr), 
which controls for the effects of business cycles, and the real lending rate (r), as the cost 
of investment. We add RS to this model to test the hypothesis that the quality of bank 
regulation and supervision increases investment by reducing transaction costs in the 
banking sector.
 INVgdp = f (RS, GDPgr, r). (2)
The regression model for nonperforming loans (as percent of credit) is given in Equa-
tion (3). In this model, r is controlled for to proxy the moral hazard risk; the real value of 
borrowed funds decreases with inflation, which affects r positively. In addition, real GDP 
growth is expected to reduce moral hazard and hence NPLcr. Finally, RS is added to test 
the impact of the formal institutional framework on the realization of moral hazard.6
 NPLcr = f (RS, GDPgr, r). (3)
It can be argued that as much as RS may affect the banking performance, there may 
be socioeconomic factors that in turn affect both RS and the indicators of banking sector 
performance. Dincer and Neyapti (2008) provide evidence that variables such as past 
crises and EU membership have especially had a significant role in explaining the varia-
tion in the extent of bank regulation and supervision intensity across countries. These 
variables are not appropriate to instrument RS in the current analysis, however, because 
they are not fully exogenous to the estimated variables; one can argue that RS may also 
be affected by past banking performance.
Table 1. Correlations between the components of RS and bank performance
DEPgdp INVgdp NPLcr
RS (average) 0.30 –0.35 –0.33
Capital requirement 0.41 –0.37 –0.05
Lending 0.33 0.27 0.02
Ownership 0.17 –0.17 –0.38
Directors and managers 0.19 –0.38 –0.17
Reporting-recording –0.27 0.04 –0.50
Corrective action 0.28 0.12 0.24
Supervision –0.21 –0.20 –0.51
Deposit insurance 0.35 –0.62 –0.07
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56 Emerging Markets Finance & Trade
Hence, as common to many studies of this nature, we use dummies for legal-origin 
(see, e.g., Glaeser and Shleifer 2002; La Porta et al. 1999, 2002; Levine 2005) and the 
index of polity, which measures the extent of democracy (democ) and autocracy (autoc) 
as instruments of institutional variables, which in this case is RS. These instrumental 
variables reflect measurements of such factors that are slow to change, if they change at 
all, and can thus be taken as deeply exogenous to the variables of interest. Glaeser and 
Shleifer discuss the importance of legal-origin in explaining financial market develop-
ment. In view of the foregoing discussion, the estimations of Equations (1)–(3) are 
performed using the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation method, where 
RS is instrumented by legal-origin and polity variables.7
Appendix C reports the results of the first-stage regressions, which reveal the significant 
explanatory power of the instruments employed in the following analysis. In particular, 
polity and democracy show positive and significant correlations with RS; autocracy has 
a negative and significant coefficient as predicted. However, while UK legal origin has 
a positive significant relationship to RS, French legal origin appears insignificant, and 
German legal origin seems to have a negative relationship with RS. These observations 
are consistent with the discussions regarding the prevalence of the protestant ethics in the 
United Kingdom, which is often associated with greater potency for development, and 
the rather inflexible code of law that is of French origin versus the flexible nature of that 
of German origin, which may have made the need for formal reforms less necessary.
Table 2 reports the estimation results of Equation (1) in a stepwise fashion.8 Besides the 
positive effect of RS on deposits, which is a robust finding across the specifications, we 
observe that both savings (Sgdp) and real deposit interest rate (rDep) have the expected 
positive signs that are significant at the 1 percent level, the latter of which seems to have 
a nonlinear effect on deposits as observed in the significance of the squared term (rDep2 ). 
The proxy for financial market development (CRgdp) is not significant, however, and 
hence dropped from the regression in the last column. The high correlation between RS 
Table 2. RS and depositor trust (dependent variable: DEPgdp)
I II III
Constant –2.31***
(–2.31)
–2.04***
(–5.18)
–1.92***
(–5.92)
RS 9.67***
(2.96)
8.99***
(3.24)
6.82***
(8.34)
CRgdp –0.44
(–0.99)
Sgdp 1.06***
(2.98)
1.95***
(7.08)
rDep 0.17
(0.91)
rDep2 0.19*
(1.81)
Number of observations 45 44 37
J-statistic 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sum of squared residuals 46.95 39.83 17.61
Notes: GMM methodology is used. RS is instrumented with polity variables. t-ratios are in parenthe-
ses. *** Statistical significance at the 1 percent level; ** statistical significance at the 5 percent level; 
* statistical significance at the 10 percent level.
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and CRgdp may be leading this result.9 We also control for Standard & Poor’s global 
equity index as a measure of the return on alternative assets, but the coefficient on this 
variable is found insignificant. The above results are also observed to remain robust to 
the choice of instruments for RS. Hence, the findings support strongly that, in addition 
to the macroeconomic variables that the economic theory suggests to explain the level of 
deposits, RS has a significant role in mobilizing savings toward the banking sector.
Table 3 shows that, in addition to the positive effect of GDPgr, RS is found to have a 
significant positive effect on investment. The effect of the real lending rate (r) is signifi-
cantly negative, as expected. These findings remain robust after the addition of CRgdp, 
which controls for the level of financial market development; because CRgdp itself is 
insignificant, however, that regression is not reported. We also use financial deepening 
(proxied by M2 over GDP) to control for financial market development; this variable 
turns out significant both alone and in interaction with RS, but loses its significance after 
the GDP growth and the interest rate are controlled for. In addition, we use a transition 
economies dummy (TE) considering that the pervasive market reforms those countries 
have undertaken may have led to a larger than average investment in the following period.10 
While we find support for this hypothesis in regressions reported in the first two columns, 
we also observe that this variable loses its significance once the cost of investment is con-
trolled for. We also control for the levels of economic development, proxied by per capita 
GDP, and financial openness. We observe that these variables do not exhibit additional 
explanatory power; hence, we do not report the regressions that include them.
In view of the varying samples across the reported regressions, we also run the regres-
sions using only the sample of the estimation reported in column III of Table 3. This 
experiment (reported in Appendix E) reveals that while the coefficient of RS is found 
positive throughout, its significance emerges after controlling for the growth rate. These 
findings suggest that formal banking regulation plays a strong role in channeling banks’ 
asset composition toward investment.
Our next set of regressions aims to address whether RS affects the ratio of credit 
not returned to banks. The answer to this question is strongly affirmative based on the 
evidence provided in Table 4; while RS is significantly negative, the rest of the control 
variables, GDPgr and r, are found insignificant. Including CRgdp to control for the level 
of financial market development does not change this result.
Several additional robustness checks can be reported as follows. In order to account 
for the possible shifts in deposit and investment behavior over time, we control for decade 
dummies for the 1990s and 2000s in the regression models reported above. If a bank 
law for a country observation is effective for most of the decade in question, the dummy 
takes the value of 1; otherwise, the dummy is 0. Although the time dimension of the data 
is limited due to the event-study nature of the current analysis, including these dummies 
helps control for the time trend in the explained variables. Focusing on the broadest 
specifications reported in the last columns of Tables 3 and 4, the following additional 
observations can be noted: Leaving the results reported above virtually unchanged, the 
1990s dummy is positive and significant for deposits, whereas the dummy for the 2000s 
seems to have an insignificant effect. Both dummies are found insignificant in explaining 
investment and nonperforming loans.11
There is an ongoing debate in the literature with regard to the diminishing marginal 
benefit of RS; the argument may suggest that too much regulation may deter banking-
sector efficiency. We test this claim by exploring the additional effects on banking-sector 
performance of the high values of RS (RSh) measured either as above the median or 
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mean value or as above the “mean plus one standard deviation.” Measured either way, 
it is observed that the coefficient of RSh turns negative for both deposits and investment, 
but is significant only for the latter.12 It should be noted, however, that this finding is not 
robust across various specifications reported above. However, as testing for an optimal 
level of regulation is beyond the scope of the current study, we conclude that the evi-
dence in the current paper indicates that increasing RS seems to deliver better banking 
performance on average.
Conclusion
Banking laws aim to reduce the vast amount of transaction costs, in the form of adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems, in the banking sector. Employing an index of the 
legal quality of bank regulation and supervision that measures the intensity of the for-
mal mechanisms to address the numerous aspects of the potential transaction costs in 
the banking sector, we empirically test the hypothesis that RS improves banking-sector 
performance by affecting both depositor trust and borrower discipline.
The evidence presented in this paper, based on an event study of up to fifty-three 
countries, supports this hypothesis strongly: Deposits and investments exhibit positive and 
significant association with RS, whereas the association between nonperforming loans and 
RS is significantly negative. The results remain robust to the addition of control variables 
such as the possible nonlinearity in the effect of RS or the indicators of financial market 
development and decade dummies. The current study thus provides additional empirical 
justification for the focus on reforming the banking regulatory frameworks around the 
world in order to achieve efficient resource allocation and effective mobilization of sav-
ings into investment as essential tenets of sustainable development.
Notes
1. Guiso et al. (2004) and Zak and Knack (2001) argue that both social capital and legal en-
forcement are important in building trust.
Table 4. RS and nonperforming loans (dependent variable: NPLcr)
I II II
Constant 0.34***
(3.81)
0.36**
(2.48)
0.45**
(2.37)
RS –1.4***
(–3.06)
–1.20**
(–2.40)
–1.03*
(–2.01)
GDPgr –0.01
(–0.62)
–0.01
(–1.44)
r –0.19
(–1.27)
Number of observations 49 44 36
J-statistic 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sum of squared residuals 0.50 0.43 0.39
Source: Compiled by the authors based on the indicators in Kaufmann et al. (2008).
Notes: GMM methodology is used. RS is instrumented with governance, legal origin, and polity 
variables. t-ratios are in parentheses. *** Statistical significance at the 1 percent level; ** statistical 
significance at the 5 percent level; * statistical significance at the 10 percent level.
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60 Emerging Markets Finance & Trade
2. Output losses are measured by cumulative percent deviation from trend GDP (Laeven and 
Valencia 2008).
3. The quantification method for the list of the ninety-nine criteria, summarized above in the 
eight main categories, has been detailed in Neyapti and Dincer (2005) and is not repeated here 
for the sake of space.
4. All the macroeconomic indicators are obtained from the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund.
5. Because there are at most two observations per country, the data can be regarded as cross-
sectional. In accordance with Hausman (1978), the fixed effects model is rejected; the short and 
unbalanced time dimension does not allow the use of random effects.
6. The negative effect of regulation on NPLs is also reported by Guiso et al. (2007) for the 
case of Italy.
7. The results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations are reported in Appendix D; the 
findings are in line with the GMM results reported in Tables 2 through 4 although the significance 
of RS is weaker for the cases of both INVgdp and NPLcr.
8. J-statistics provide the test of overidentifying restrictions in a GMM context, and a small 
number, in general, indicates model (or instrument) validity (the critical value is given by the chi-
squared distribution with [p – q] degrees of freedom, where q is the moment conditions and p is 
the number of parameters to be estimated).
9. Regressions in Table 2 are repeated using time deposits as the dependent variable; the 
results remain virtually the same as above and hence are not reported given the relatively limited 
observations on this variable.
10. We report the TE dummy only in the INVgdp model because it is found insignificant in 
DEPgdp and NPLcr data cover only the 2000s, when those economies are considered no longer 
to be in transition.
11. However, in the restricted versions of these models, decade dummies are observed to pick 
up some of the variation, turning out significant.
12. These results are available from the authors upon request.
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Appendix A. Scatter Plots of RS and Financial Performance
Figure A1. Scatter plot of RS versus output loss from crises
Figure A2. Scatter plot of RS versus deposits-to-GDP ratio
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Figure A3. Scatter plot of RS and investment-to-GDP ratio
Figure A4. Scatter plot of RS versus the ratio of nonperforming loans
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Table D1. RS and depositor trust (dependent variable: DEPgdp)
I II III
Constant –0.02
(–1.21)
–0.29***
(–5.17)
–0.46**
(–2.67)
RS 1.75***
(7.02)
0.67***
(5.60)
1.43***
(11.50)
CRgdp 0.51***
(9.23)
Sgdp 1.43***
(4.54)
2.70***
(4.42)
rDep 0.07*
(1.73)
rDep2 0.08**
(2.32)
Number of observations 45 44 37
Sum of squared residuals 10.29 6.49 6.82
Notes: t-ratios are in parentheses. *** Statistical significance at the 1 percent level; ** statistical 
significance at the 5 percent level; * statistical significance at the 10 percent level.
Appendix D. OLS Regressions
Table D2. RS and investment (dependent variable: INVgdp)
I II III
Constant 0.20***
(10.64)
0.20***
(9.49)
0.16***
(7.06)
RS 0.06
(0.96)
0.01
(0.09)
0.06
(1.35)
TE –0.00
(–0.10)
0.01
(0.75)
–0.01
(–0.67)
GDPgr 0.36***
(15.68)
1.49***
(10.23)
r –0.04***
(–6.52)
Number of observations 63 56 34
Sum of squared residuals 0.17 0.15 0.07
Notes: t-ratios are in parentheses. *** Statistical significance at the 1 percent level; ** statistical 
significance at the 5 percent level; * statistical significance at the 10 percent level.
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Appendix E. Adjusting the sample in Table 3 (dependent variable: INVgdp)
I II III
Constant –0.03
(–0.15)
0.02***
(0.42)
0.02
(0.56)
RS 0.78
(1.33)
0.49***
(6.41)
0.46***
(7.28)
TE 0.06
(0.74)
0.03
(1.06)
0.03
(0.91)
GDPgr 1.38***
(9.26)
1.76***
(39.00)
r –0.05***
(–4.52)
Number of observations 34 34 34
J-statistic 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sum of squared residuals 0.30 0.14 0.13
Notes: t-ratios are in parentheses. *** Statistical significance at the 1 percent level; ** statistical 
significance at the 5 percent level; * statistical significance at the 10 percent level.
Table D3. RS and nonperforming loans (dependent variable: NPLcr)
I II II
Constant 0.13***
(4.93)
0.10***
(2.86)
0.09
(0.68)
RS –1.17***
(–2.02)
–0.12
(–1.36)
–0.11
(–1.03)
GDPgr 0.00
(0.75)
–0.00
(–0.11)
r 0.02
(0.20)
Number of observations 49 44 36
Sum of squared residuals 0.20 0.15 0.12
Notes: t-ratios are in parentheses. *** Statistical significance at the 1 percent level; ** statistical 
significance at the 5 percent level; * statistical significance at the 10 percent level.
To order reprints, call 1-800-352-2210; outside the United States, call 717-632-3535.
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